The Euthyphro -- How (not) to define piety

(A dialogue about giving definitions)

1. First Definition (p. 3):

Piety is doing what I’m doing - prosecuting anyone guilty of murder, even one’s father. (Didn’t Zeus do just the same?)

Socrates’ Reply (p. 4): Don’t just give me one or two examples of piety, but rather explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. I need a standard, which I can consult to determine whether an act is pious or not. A list of examples doesn’t do that.

2. Second Definition (p. 4):

Piety is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

Socrates’ reply (p. 6): We are told that the gods disagree with one another; what is dear to one is hated by another. And so according to this definition, it would seem that some acts are both pious and impious.  But since piety and impiety are opposites, it would seem that no act should be both at once.  And so this definition appears to lead to a contradiction.

Note: Socrates also notes that we are told the gods have much the same kinds of disagreements that Euthyphro has with his family (pp. 5-6).  So appealing to the gods offers little help.

Note further: Although Socrates says a little about the difficulty determining just what the gods might like or dislike (p. 6), this is NOT his major complaint.

3. Third Definition (p. 7):

Piety is what all the gods love; impiety is what they all hate.

Socrates’ reply (p. 7): Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

          The point: The definition doesn’t really capture the essence of piety.  It isn’t being loved by the gods that makes an action pious, but something else, which serves as the reason for the gods holding it dear (there must be some reason for the gods to love what they do, else piety would seem arbitrary).  Instead, this definition only identifies an attribute (or effect) of piety. (p. 9)

At this point, Socrates steps in: "I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety." (p. 9)

1. Identify a more extended notion of which it is a part (a genus).

2. Then specify how it is different from the other parts of that more extended notion (supply a differentia).

 Examples: Define “Prime”, or “Mullet”

4. Fourth Definition (p. 10):

Piety is that part of justice which attends to the gods.

Socrates’ reply: It’s not clear what "attend" means in this context. Surely we don’t attend to gods in the same manner that we attend to horses, dogs, or children, for we are not able to benefit or improve them.

5. Fifth Definition (p. 11):

Piety is that part of justice concerning service or ministration to the gods; it is learning how to please them in word and deed.

Socrates’ reply : Again, this is vague. For what end is such service aimed?  Surely the gods cannot be improved or benefited by our piety.

6. Sixth Definition (p. 12):

Piety is the art or science by which gods and men do business with one another.

Socrates’ reply: Once again, what do the gods gain from their end of the bargain? Nothing substantial, it would seem, beyond what they find pleasing. So this definition seems to have traveled full circle (like Daedalus’ maze) back to the third definition. (p. 13)

A Moral: If we want to characterize piety (or doing right), perhaps it’s best to leave the gods out of the picture.